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PROBLEMS OF MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN ECOWAS 1

S. E. OMORUYP
Abstract
The paper examines the problems of monetary and financial
integration in the ECOWAS sub-region. It traces the origins
of these problems to the post-colonial era when sentimental
attachment to issues of sovereignty, development of national
currencies and the imposition of payments restrictions took
their roots. Given the background of these problems, the
paper makes a number of recommendations, such as the
need to adopt a common currency and more realistic
exchange rates, for forging greater monetary co-operation in
the sub-region.

potentialities of the community for realising the global
objective of raising the standard of living of the ECOWAS
citizens and of contributing to Africa's development. A major
channel for achieving this as contained in the Treaty includes
the elimination of all types of obstacles to the free movement
of goods, capital and persons.
However, there are a number of constraints, economic, social
and political, that are likely to limit the quick realisation of the
economic union. The focus of this paper is largely on the
monetary and financial constraints. For purposes of easy
exposition, the paper has been divided into five parts. Part
I highlights the theoretical concepts of integration. Part II
discusses early attempts at monetary integration. Part III
focusses on the problems of integration. Part IV highlights the
institutional arrangement, the West African Clearing House
(WACH), designed to accelerate integration efforts. Part V
contains the paper's conclusions and recommendations for
policy.

Introduction

Since the inception of the Economic Community of West
African States on May 28, 1975 and the later adoption of the
protocols in Accra, the community has continued to grapple
with problems. A great many public servants and African
scholars in particular have dwelt exhaustively on the

PART I
to each other even though the rates may, in unison,
vary relative to non-union currencies; and

Concept of monetary integration

Monetary integration is the monetary unification of
participating member countries in an ecomonic union and
involves the adoption of common currency, co-ordinated
exchange-rate policies, and harmonization of fiscal and
monetary policies.' It is a process that can only be envisaged
during the final stages of economic integration.
The final stages are those ofan "economic union" and "total
economic integration".• Under the stage ofan economic union,
restrictions on commodity and factor movements are
abolished among member states and some degree of
harmonization of economic, monetary, fiscal and social
policies is undertaken. The highest degree of economic
integration - the last stage - is total economic integration
which involves the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and
other policies and requires the establishment of a
supra-national agency whose decisions are binding on all
member states.
Corden' is agreeable with Nana-Sinkam on the above
definition of monetary integration but emphasizes that the
concept essentially involves:
(i)
an exchange-rate union, ie. an area within which
exchange rates bear a permanently fixed relationship

(ii)

convertibility - the permanent absence of all
exchange controls, whether for current or capital
transactions, within the area.

Thus the adoption of fixed exchange-rate margins among
the currencies of member states, or the adoption of a common
single currency, the pooling of foreign exchange reserves, a
common Central Bank, factor mobility and harmonization of
monetary and fiscal policies are the key ingredients ofa durable
monetary union.
There is, however, a related but wider concept of financial
integration. This is the integration of organised or formal
capital markets such as the Stock exchange in the participating
member countries of the economic union. Such integration
would involve a harmonization of regional financial markets,
particularly with respect to interest rates on securities and
capital transactions. Financial integration also involves
co-ordination of trading in community securities, of issuance
of financial instruments to finance community projects at
agreed locations, etc.•

'Also presented at the 4th Biennial Conference of the West African Economic Association held at Lome, Togo in March, 1987.
'Mr. S. E. Omoruyi is Deputy Director of Research, Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria.
'S. C. Nana-Sinkam. Monetary Integratton and Theory of Optional Currency Areas in Africa, Mouton Publishers I 978, The Hague.
'The first three stages of economic integration identified in the literature are the free trade area where tariffs and other trade restrictions between members
are abolished; the Customs Union which involves the abolition of discrimination in movements of commodities and the erection of a common tariff wall
against non-members; the third stage is the common market where trade restrictions and impediments to factor movement are abolished.
'Corden, W. M., Monetary Integration, Essays in International Finance, N.93, Princeton University; Princeton, I 972 P.2.
'Basch. A.. Capital Jfarkets oft he European Economic Community- Problems oflntegration, Graduate School of Business Administration, The University
ofMichigan. 1965.
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PART II
Frnch-speaking countries of West Africa to form a monetary
union, namely, the West African Monetary Union (Union
Monetaire l'Ouest Africaine - UMOA), embracing Benin,
Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania,' Senegal, Upper Volta (now
Bourkina Fasso) and Togo. The powers of BCEAO were
widened to include the functions of a common Central bank
for the seven member states. The bank's functions include the
issue of a common currency, the Communaute Financiere
Africaine or CFA Franc. Some other features of this Bank are
as follows:
(i)
The CFA Franc is fixed to French Franc and equals
0.02 of the French Franc; or 50 CFA Franc to l French
Franc;
(ii) The external reserves of all the participating countries
are pooled under the control of BCEAO and are held
exclusively in the form of French Francs;
(iii) Payments and receipts in foreign currency of the
BCEAO are settled through an account called the
Operations Account with the French Treasury;
(iv) France guarantees unlimited conversion of the CFA
Franc into French Franc. This guarantee operates
through the French Treasury providing automatic
overdraft facilities to the BCEAO especially when the
Operations Account goes into red;
(v) In line with other Central banks in the Anglophone
area, the BCEAO is empowered to exercise credit
controls and to prescribe credit ceilings not only for
each country but also within each country for each
bank and enterprise. The BCEAO can also vary the
rediscount rate and it can also prescribe liquidity ratios
for banks;
(vi) The monetary management system ofthe UMOA does
not permit exchange rate changes as a policy option
nor is there freedom for individual countries to pursue
unco-ordinated monetary expansion. Rather the
member countries have accepted the beneficial
discipline arising from the collective use of strict fiscal,
monetary and pricing policies for the management of
their economies;
(vii) The development of the less developed members of
UMOA is encouraged by a resource transfer strategy
that employs a less stringent application of the fiscal
rules on such countries. This process is further directly
assisted by the industrial redistribution strategies of
the West African Development Bank (BOAD), the
investment banking counterpart of the BCEAO within
UMOA.
The UMOA arrangement remains in force although Guinea,
Mali and Mauritania broke away from the franc zone at
different times. However, Mali re-entered the union in July,
1984.
In what follows a discussion of the numerous problems
of monetary integration including monetary credit and fiscal
disharmony emanating from the above post-independence
monetary systems of the sub-region, is undertaken.

Monetary zones in the sub-region

Having discussed, albeit briefly, the theoretical concepts of
monetary and financial integration, we shall in this section
dwell on monetary zones in the sub-region - the source of
major problems of monetary integration.
Sterling Monetary Zone

The Currency Board system marked the beginning of
monetary integration in British West Africa. For approximately
fifty years, monetary integration was operated but it had
defects. Commenting on the Board system, J. Mars,1 a writer
on colonial currency system observed that:
The West African Currency Board is in fact not a money
issuing bank with power to vary the amount of currency at
will but merely a passive money changer which receives
superior money ie. London sterling and gives in return token
money ie. West African Currency.
However, with the advantage ofhindsight the currency Board
system had some merit. It provided confidence in the currency
and ensured to a large extent stability in the internal and
external value of the local currency, for instance, and was
convertible in all parts of Africa and Europe through its link
to sterling. It also provided a good basis for economic
integration of the member countries.
The Franc Monetary Zone

Before 1945 the currency arrangement evolved by France
for her colonial territories in West Africa was handled by the
Bank of West Africa established in 190 l exclusively to issue
Franc notes into circulation in French West Africa colonies.'
The Bank which absorbed the Bank of Senegal established
earlier in 1856, had its head office in Paris, with branches in
Conakry, Port Novo, Dakar, Grand-Bassam and Duala.
In 1955, the right of note issue was, however, transferred
from the Bank of West Africa to a publicly-owned institution
Institut d'Emission de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise et du
Togo. This bank was given an additional function of a bank of
last resort. Its name was changed to la Banque Centrale des
Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) in 1959
The Currency System of the Post-Independence period

Soon after the attainment of political independence by
countries of West Africa, the colonial currency system ofBritish
West Africa crumbled in the wake of establishment of national
Central banks in all West African countries as well as
indigenous and state-owned commercial and development
banks. During this period, Ghana departed in 1957 from the
inherited systems of monetary integration by pulling out of the
West African Currency Board system. She was followed by
Nigeria in 1959, Sierra Leone in 1963, and The Gambia in
1975. The abandonment of currency integration policies in
British West African countries reflected largely the desire of
those countries to assert political independence, thus bringing
an end to the pre-independence monetary integration that
existed in the Anglo-phone zone.
On May 12, 1961, France concluded an agreement on
economic, financial and monetary co-operation with the

'J. Mars. Mining, Banking and Commerce in Nigeria, 1948.
'The French West Africa consisted of Dahomey (now Benin), Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta (now Bourkina-Fasso).
Togo was later included.
'Mauritania withdrew from the union in 1972.
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PART III
ECO WAS have been identified. (See Table I, Appendix). These
include currencies that are pegged to major traded currencies;
currencies that are pegged to the SDR; currencies that are
pegged to a basket of currencies; and finally, currencies of which
the exchange rate is determined by a managed or independent
float. The regimes have implications for the degrees of
overvaluation or undervaluation of the various currencies. The
francophone member countries of the UMOA group tend to
maintain undervalued exchange rates whereas different
degrees ofovervaluation characterise the exchange rate regimes
of the Anglophone members of ECO WAS - Ghana, Nigeria
and Sierra Leone. Interestingly, the non-UMOA countries of
The Gambia, Liberia and Mauritania tend to maintain
currencies that are substantially undervalued.' There is then
the problem of arriving at an exchange rate for each member
country currency that would "equilibrate" the balance of
payments not only for her economy but for the sub-regional
economy as a whole.

Problems of monetary and fiscal disharmony
Monetary constraints
It was mentioned in Part I of this paper that while the

French-speaking countries in the UMOA in the sub-region
continue to use the CFA franc as their common currency,
countries in British West Africa adopted their individual
currencies soon after attaining political independence. The
multiplicity of these currencies and the inconvertibility of most
of them create problems for payments arrangements and
inter-state commercial transactions. Currency inconvertibility
impedes a free flow of goods and services and capital
movements and unilateral transfers. Thus, ECOWAS member
states have had to settle most of their foreign trade balance in
scarce non-regional currencies such as the Pound Sterling, the
French Franc and the U.S. dollar.
The best way to avoid the above problems is to adopt a
monetary union. However, the road to monetary union is a very
difficult one: For instance, under a monetary union individual
member countries would forgo their rights to determine their
credit policy. Instead such policy would have to be determined
by a centralised body. Here we are faced by the problem of
ascertaining the rate of credit expansion that is adequate for
each economy.
A monetary union calls for uniformity in interest rates in
order to avoid distortions from capital flows within the union.
Again, this is problematic since in reality the same interest rate
cannot meaningfully hold for each country in the sub-region.
An appropriate interest rate level in one country may be
inappropriate for another, given differing levels of
infrastructural development. Thus the problem of
harmonization of interest rates constitutes a major constraint
to monetary integration.

It will be observed that member countries ofECOWAS are
at different levels ofeconomic development. Thus maintaining
a common exchange rate in line with the requirements of a
monetary union could result in undesirable distortions, as the
common rate may tend to favour some member countries.'
Problems of financial integration

Financial integration involves the harmonization of the
capital markets in the sub-region. It suggests inter alia the need
for member states to streamline real interest rates on securities
of the same type and quality throughout the community. It
also calls for elimination of any asymmetries that exist in
the interest rates charged on capital transactions. Financial
integration also suggests the need for joint issuance of financial
in~truments when the need to finance community projects
anses.

Fiscal Policy Constraints

In the sub-region there exists a panoply of different tariff
arrangements with differing rates of customs duties. The duties
are designed partly to earn increased revenue for government
and partly to shield domestic industries from competition from
foreign producers. In a monetary union, there is the problem
of lowering of tariff walls under the union policy of trade
liberalisation. This problem derives from the fact that most
countries of the sub-region depend largely on customs and
excise duties as sources ofrevenue.
There are asymmetries in overall tax structures in the
sub-region and size of government budgets varies from country
to country. There is then the problem of devising ways of
harmonizing the tax structures, sizes of government budgets
including different profiles of overall borrowing requirements
of each government in the union.

Besides the obvious problems inherent in the above, largely
problems of implementation, there are in ECOWAS member
countries a number of legislations discriminating against
foreign securities or against the export of domestic securities.
These laws have to be reviewed; in particular, company law
and tax laws need to be harmonized.
Political problem

Although ECOWAS is eleven years old, nation states in the
community still seem to guard their sovereignty. An integration
problem would arise where the expected co-operation in
implementing agreed-upon protocols is not forthcoming from
member states because of their strong attachment to notions
of sovereignty. Thus the pace and successful implementation
of monetary integration in the community would depend
largely on political will.

Exchange rate constraints

There exist different exchange rate regimes' in the
sub-region. By and large, four exchange rate regimes in

'An exchange rate regime may be defined as or denoted by the system or method by which the exchange rate is determined.
'ECOWAS. Creation o(a Single ECO!,US Jfonctarr Zone. Lagos February. 1986. (Unpublished ECOWAS Study).
'S. M. Nsouli. Ibid. P.44.
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PART IV
Problems of the West African Clearing House (WACH)

Problems of WACH

An analysis of the problems of monetary integration would
be incomplete if mention is not made of an institutional
arrangement - the WACH - established and designed to
foster monetary co-operation within the sub-region. This
section therefore discusses the WACH and the problems
encountered in its efforts at promoting sub-regional limited
currency convertibility.'
Established in 1975 under an agreement by the West African
Central Banks, the WACH had the following aims and
objectives:
(a) to promote the use of the currencies of the members
of the Clearing House' for sub-regional trade and other
transactions;
(b) to bring about economies in the use of foreign reserves
of members of the Clearing House;
(c) to encourage the members of the Clearing House to
liberalise trade among their respective countries;
(d) to promote monetary co-operation and consultation
among the members of the Clearing House.
Of these objectives, the most important, at least, from the
point of view of this paper, is that of the promotion of
convertibility ofregional currencies and thereby the saving in
the use of foreign exchange such as the U.S. dollar, Pound
Sterling, French Franc, etc. However, being themselves very
conscious of the shortage of convertible currencies in the
region, the Central Banks were of the view that the best means
of ensuring regional convertibility was to enforce prompt
settlement. Therefore, the settlement rules in WACH were
designed to ensure the minimum of delay.
Unlike some clearing systems in other third world regions'
WACH made no provision for the creation of a fund or direct
bilateral contributions to facilitate the settlement of protracted
debtor balances. The credits available in the system are related
to volumes of previous transactions and stipulate a country
minimum of500,000 WAUA• (West African Unit of Account)
for debit positions and 1,000,000 WAUA for creditors. All
debtor positions are expected to be settled monthly and
promptly on demand and not later than 15 days after the month
to which the debt relates. The WACH's function is to monitor
these transactions in a capacity little more than that of an
accounting office.'

A major problem which frustrates the realisation of the
principal objective of the WACH, namely, promotion oflarger
use of regional currencies in regional transactions, has been the
observed low and reducing volumes of compensable trade.•
This means that adequate volumes of intra-regional exports
do not compensate the volume ofimports and vice-versa. Thus
trade between the member countries was not balanced, so that
very large amounts of merchandise trade still had to be settled
by the use of external (non-regional) convertible currencies,
(see Tables 2 and 3).
As is evident in Table 2, trade imbalances were, for instance
in 1980, most pronounced in intra-regional trade relations with
Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania and Sierra Leone. Thus the need
for non-regional currencies for the settlement of trade with
those countries was quite high as figures in column 5 of the
Table show. The observation was also true for the UMOA
countries as a group. The analysis in Table 3 line 9 shows
that in the WACH the percentage of transactions that require
non-regional currencies to settle trended upward in the
quinquennium 1976-1980. Since 1980 there has been no
reversal of the trend. Thus the achievement of the cardinal
objective of limited currency convertibility has eluded the
WACH mechanism.
A related problem confronting the WACH has been the
accumulation of debtor balances. This again contradicts an
important condition for limited convertibilty of soft currencies
within the clearing house, namely, the undertaking at Central
bank level for prompt settlement as advised by the Clearing
House in accordance with the provisions of Articles VIII and
IX of the Clearing House Agreement. The debts have been
owed largely to BCEAO and National Bank of Liberia.
The reality, however, that WACH is merely a clearing agency
has not helped matters. This is so because the WACH has no
provision in the Agreement for the creation of a fund or direct
bilateral contributions to facilitate the settlement of debtor
balances. Thus, as presently constituted the WACH mechanism
is fraught with difficulties that constrain its role as an
instrument of monetary co-operation in the sub-region.

'Limited currency convertibility may be defined as "the unrestricted exchange and use of the currencies of countries within the region vis-a-vis each other
ie. where all exchange restrictions vis-a-vis the other currencies of the group have been eliminated". For further details see IMF, Currencv Convertibilitv in
·
·
the Economic Community of West African States, 1980 (Unpublished IMF Study for Executive Secretariat ofECOWAS).
'The list of member Central Banks of the WACH is as follows: Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Central Bank of The Gambia (Gambank),
Bank of Ghana (Ghanabank), Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea (Bareg), National Bank of Guinea Bissau (Banguine), National Bank of Liberia
(Batbank), Central Bank pf Mauritania (Rimbank), Central Bank of Nigeria (Cenbank) and Bank of Sierra Leone (Coppersafe).
'Examples of clearing systems with credit facilities include the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing facility established in 1977 for member states of the
Caribbean Community; the Central American Clearing House (1981 ), the ALA DI Clearing System established in 1969 and revised in 1981 for the eleven
Latin American countries.
'l WAUA=SDR I
'J. Frimpong Ansah, A Preliminary Study on Financing Mechanisms at Central Bank level in the ECO WAS Sub-region in support of a process of Trade
Libera/i::ation and for the settlement of Debtor Balances in the lies/ African Clearing House; UNCTAD Study Project RAF/77/032, February 1983
(Unpublished mimeo).
'Compensable trade is the volume of merchandise transactions which go through the clearing mechanism and which are settled in regional currencies. The
concept is different from that of"settled trade" which is the proportion ofECOWAS regional total trade that is settled in convertible non-regional currencies
such as the U.S. dollar, Pound Sterling, etc.
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PARTY
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper has examined the problems of monetary and
financial integration in the ECOWAS sub-region. In the
process, it made forays into early attempts at monetary
co-operation through institutional arrangements such as the
BCEAO- the common Central bank of the francophone West
African countries - and the defunct West African Currency
Board which served the Anglophone countries in the
sub-region. However, with the attainment of political
independence by the nation states of ECOWAS, the
Anglophone countries among them established their
individual Central banks and abandoned the West African
Currency Board system.
Such was the genesis of the current problems of the
sub-regional monetary and fiscal disharmony. The assertion
of the freedom of independence and the needs for economic
management of fledgling economies, particularly among the
Anglophone countries were reflected in the establishment of
various national currencies and the emergence of payment
restrictions designed to protect nationalistic interests. The
sentimental attachment to issues of sovereignty, development
of national currencies, and existence of exchange rate regimes
and payments restrictions have featured prominently in the
mainstream of problems that could frustrate the achievement
of a monetary union in the sub-region.
The paper has also discussed the WACH mechanism which
is an institutional arrangement designed to foster intra-regional
trade through inter alia the promotion of the use of currencies
of member countries ofECOWAS. Even so, this instrument of
monetary co-operation is beset with problems: they range from
excessive recourse to use of non-regional currencies following
the observed low and reducing volumes of compensable trade
to WACH's inability to arrest the accumulation of debtor
balances through prompt settlement.
Therefore, in order to minimise the above problems and
forge monetary co-operation for purposes of increased
intra-regional trade and enhanced standards of living of
citizens in the community, the following recommendations are
suggested:
1.
In view of the serious problems inherent in the
existence of many currencies with varying degrees of
convertibility, there is need to adopt a common
currency. The common currency may be modelled
after the UMOA common currency system. The
current ECOWAS study on the creation of a single
ECOWAS monetary zone should be pursued
vigorously with a view to finding a suitable way of

adopting a common currency and resolving the
common currency guarantee problem;
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2.

Given the need to attract increased trade to WACH,
illegal border trade would have to be seriously
curtailed through the adoption by member countries
of more realistic and market-related exchange rates.
Such rates could also minimise considerably the
problems of overvaluation of national currencies,
especially those of the Anglophone countries.
Countries in the ECOWAS sub-region may thus have
to accept to undergo the discipline of exchange rates
adjustments through substantial devaluations of their
currencies;

3.

Considering the existence of disharmony in member
countries' monetary, credit and fiscal policies, some
form of harmonization is required in these areas to
serve the overall interests of member countries of the
sub-region;

4.

The WACH would further the achievement of limited
currency convertibility if it is endowed with capacity
to provide short-term financial support or credit to
clear debit positions in situations of temporary
liquidity shortage of debtor countries. This will
encourage member countries to increase and liberalise
their intra-regional trade as they can find an assured
source of short-term trade finance. The burden of
creditor countries in extending involuntary short-term
credit will also be lightened. Thus WACH would be
not only a clearing but also a settlement agency. It
should be noted, however, that given the seemingly
permanent debtor positions of some member
countries, the creation of a special fund to finance
the deficits may serve only as mere palliatives to the
problem;

5.

There is need for member states to exercise a greater
degree of co-operation than is the case at present,
such that agreements regarding protocols, etc. are not
frustrated by lack of political will to implement them.
Certainly, implementation would involve, in some
cases, surrender of part of absolute sovereignty; but
this short-term cost is inevitable so long as member
states are really determined to forge a monetary union
with all expectations of long-term benefits to the
community.
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Appendix
Table I
Types of Exchange Regimes in ECO WAS

Country

Pegged to Major
Currencies

Benin
Cape Verde
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Upper Volta
(now Bourkina Fasso)

Pegged to
SDR

Pegged toa
Basket of
Currencies

Flexible
Exchange Rate

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X = indicates applicable exchange rate regime.
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Table 2
ECOWAS REGIONAL TRADE (INCLUSIVE OF OIL)
THEORETICAL MAXIMUM COMPENSABLE TRADE
$ million

1980

Imports
(I)

UMOA
(incl. Mali') ...........................
Cape Verde ............................
Gambia .................................
Ghana ....................................
Guinea ...................................
Guinea-Bissau .......................
Liberia ...................................
Mauritania ............................
Nigeria...................................
Sierra Leone ..........................

136.05
0.40
5.76
241.00
3.88
2.74
12.50
2.78
83.00
53.52

TOTAL. .................................

541.63

Exports
(2)

Total
(3)

67.12

203.17
0.40
11.96
281.40
5.56
422
22.30
2.84
531.00
53.52

6.20
40.40
1.68
1.48
9.80
0.06
448.00
574.74

1,116.37

Compensable
(4)
(lower x 2)
134.24
11.52
80.80
3.36
2.96
19.60
0.12
166.00
418.60

Settled
(5)
(3-4)

%
Settled
(6)
(5+3)

68.93
0.40
0.44
200.60
2.20
1.26
2.70
2.72
365.00
53.52

33.93
100.00
3.68
71.29
39.57
29.86
12.11
95.77
68.74
100.00

697.77

62.50

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book, IMF 1981

' Excludes intra UMOA-Mali trade.

Table 3
PERFORMANCE OF THE WEST AFRICAN CLEARING HOUSE
(TRADE INCLUSIVE OF OIL)
Calendar Year Million WAVA ( = SDR)

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

Exports (FOB) .................................................................................. .
Imports (CIF) ................................................................................... .
Total Intra-regional Trade (I+ 2) ...................................................... .
Compensable trade ........................................................................... .
% Compensable trade (4+3) ............................................................. .

251.29
222.77
474.06
225.89
47.56

307.57
342.01
649.58
281.21
43.29

286.24
278.88
565.13
247.50
43.80

340.71
323.53
564.24
272.86
41.08

438.01
412.78
850.79
319.78
37.58

6. Total transactions channelled through WACH ................................ .
7. Of which trade transactions channelled .......................................... .
8. Transactions cleared ......................................................................... .
9. Transactions cleared as% of total transactions (8+6) ..................... .
10. Trade transactions as% of total transactions channelled (7+6) ...... .
11. Trade channelled as% of total intra-regional trade (7+3) ............... .
12. Trade channelled as% of compensable trade (7+4) ........................ .

18.40'
10.90'
4.27
23.21'
59.24

45.20
35.00
13.09
28.96
77.43
5.39
12.45

52.00
35.70
14.15
27.21
68.65
6.32
14.42

72.82
45.52
18.04
24.77
62.51
6.85
16.68

162.69
50.42
23.70
14.57
30.99
5.93
15.77

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.

'Covers only last 6 months of 1976
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book, IMF, 1981.
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